Testing money supply endogeneity : the case of Greece (1975-1998) by Panagopoulos, Yannis & Spiliotis, Aristotelis
European Research Studies 
Volume IX, Issue (1-2), 2006 
 
Testing Money Supply Endogeneity: 
The Case of Greece (1975-1998)1. 
 
by Yannis Panagopoulos 
Centre of Planning and Economic Research (Κ.Ε.Π.Ε.), Athens, Greece. 
and 
Aristotelis Spiliotis 
Technological Educational Institute of Piraeus and Proton Bank S.A., 
 Athens, Greece. 
Abstract 
The main purpose of this paper is to trace whether, for a prolonged pe-
riod of time (1975-1998), money supply in Greece was endogenously or exo-
genously determined. In the theoretical part, we briefly report the Orthodox 
vis- a- vis the post Keynesian views on the issue. From the statistical evi-
dence we conclude that : a) the deregulation process of the late 80’s did not 
produce any structural break in the Greek monetary aggregates and b) under 
specific assumptions, money in Greece can be considered as endogenously 
determined. This implies that in the Greek monetary system the central bank 
behaves as a lender of last resort. 
J.E.L. Classification : E51. 
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1. Introduction 
The main purpose of this paper is to examine whether money in Greece 
is endogenously determined. More analytically, this paper incorporates the 
following sections. Section 2 briefly presents the basic differences between 
the post Keynesian and the Orthodox school of thought, regarding the exoge-
nous or endogenous nature of money. Section 3 gives us a brief historical 
review concerning the deregulation process of the Greek financial system. 
                                                        
1
 The authors would like to thank Hara Messini and Costas Papachristopoulos for 
reading and commenting this paper.  
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Section 4 presents the existing empirical evidence on the money endogeneity 
issue from the Greek as well as from the international literature.  
In section 5, the variables and the data which will be used in the empiri-
cal part of this paper, are presented. Section 6 justifies the implementation of 
the selected econometric methodology -Lutkepohl and Reimers (1992) 
bivariate VAR causality approach- along with a brief discussion on the pro-
duced causality results. Finally, the concluding comments concerning the 
nature of money in Greece appear in section 7.  
2. The theoretical debate regarding monetary policy  
In the regulated financial environment of the 70’s up to the 80’s the con-
frontation of the high level of inflation was globally a priority. For the ortho-
dox economists, the general idea was that because inflation is a monetary 
phenomenon (Freedman 1982) money growth controllability could be the 
only remedy for such a “decease”. More specifically, the central bank, basi-
cally through its open market policy can affect commercial banks level of 
reserves and consequently control their credit expansion which is related 
with the monetary growth. For the effectiveness of such policy central bank 
will be assisted by its dominating role over the other main player of the fi-
nancial macroeconomic environment (e.g. the commercial banks). In other 
words, the central bank through the open market policy and therefore reserve 
restraint, can exogenously control the high power money which consequently 
implies an effective control over monetary aggregates and inflation. This 
exogenous and effective usage of the high power money as well as the rela-
tive power of the central bank over commercial banks, was historically 
named Monetarism2. 
On the other hand, the theoretical counterargument was that no restric-
tion on monetary aggregates by the central bank is possible because com-
mercial banks can escape by following the principle “loans make deposits 
and deposits make reserves” (Lavoie, 1984). So, despite the central bank’s 
dominating role, no reserve restrictions can be effective when economic 
agents need credit. Credit-money is not easily restricted because it is demand 
driven and therefore endogenous to the real economic world. The outcome of 
                                                        
2
 When Monetarism is implemented monetary authorities can restrict money supply 
by direct and / or indirect control on the quantity of money. In an extreme version of 
this approach, the quantity of money can be perfectly inelastic with respect to the 
interest rates and always independent of exogenous shift factors which are related to 
the demand for money. In statistical terms, any sort of money exogeneity will imply 
that the different monetary aggregates (e.g. M1, M3 and M4) “are caused by” and 
therefore restricted, when necessary, by monetary base.  
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such approach, paraphrasing Moore (1989), is the reversal of the orthodox 
theoretical causation between high power money and monetary aggregates 
we mention in advance. In a Post Keynesian world, the central bank, during 
the administrated period, assumes that it follows the lender of last resort atti-
tude3 which was named Horizontialism (see Moore, 1989).  
However, from the late 80’s onwards, this “tug of war” between central 
bank and the commercial banks was affected by the introduction of financial 
innovations especially in developed countries. In particular, the existing de-
regulated and liberalized financial environment substantially helped com-
mercial banks to develop and use the new financial products (e.g. Repos, 
Certificate of Deposits, the Eurodollars etc) which could provide a much 
bigger liquidity to the commercial banks ability to deal with the existing de-
manded credit. This inevitably led to a greater ability to an easier “escape” 
from the central bank’s restrictive policies (whenever these were applied). In 
other words, commercial banks became less controllable by the central bank. 
In the post-Keynesian literature (see Pollin 1991, Palley 1994, Vera 2001 
etc), the phenomenon was named liability management policy on behalf of 
the commercial banks point of view. 
According to the existing non-orthodox literature, one way we can trace 
the symptoms of such evolution in a financial system is by observing the 
commercial banks liquidity positions, regarding the loan/reserve and the 
loan/deposit ratios. If they are expanded irrespective of the monetary aggre-
gates growth4, then a liability management policy is applied from the com-
mercial banks.  
The new financial products that implemented progressively during the 
deregulation period initially helped commercial banks to accommodate de-
mand for credit in an easier way than during the administrated period (rein-
forcing the endogenous nature of money) and consequently to gradually 
overturn the existing relative power between the central bank and the com-
mercial banks. The new status quo of the 90’s -concerning the relative power 
and its consequences for the endogeneity of money- was also underlined by 
Chick (1995) when she argued that “Today, most central banks are experi-
                                                        
3
 This implies that policymakers set the interest rates at a level where reserve re-
quirements are met and where the quantity of money is simultaneously determined 
by the portfolio preference of private sector banks and non-banks. Central bank plays 
the leading role and commercial banks follow the strategy of “price setters and quan-
tity takers” (see Moore, 1989). Moreover, the Central bank had the leading obligation 
of preserving the solvency of the banking system (see Goodhart, 1994). In statistical 
terms, this will imply that monetary base “causes” the different monetary aggregates 
and this in empirical terms define money endogeneity. 
4
 For instance, in econometric terms, they may have different unit root behaviour 
during the examined period from the other monetary aggregate variables. 
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encing greater difficulty controlling the banks, which have grown relatively 
to central banks. So the theory of the supply of money has been recasted by 
PKs, who play down the role of the central bank, emphasizing instead the 
demand for credit, which the (commercial) banks are assumed, one way or 
another, to accommodate. Modern money is endogenous5”. 
Elaborating this argument a bit further, in a deregulated financial envi-
ronment central banks are expected to be very cautious imposing any quanti-
tative restrictive measures for controlling monetary aggregates (e.g. by con-
trolling reserves), not just because they do not want to jeopardize the sol-
vency of the banking system but also due to the central bank’s natural weak-
ness in its relative power “battle” with commercial banks. This evolution 
reinforces the post-Keynesian view regarding the central bank’s behaviour as 
a lender of last resort.  
3. A brief review of the deregulation process of the Greek financial sys-
tem  
For the 70’s and 80’s the Greek financial system has been historically 
considered as a highly and strictly regulated one. In particular, as Eichen-
green and Gibson (2001) report, in the 1980’s the three bigger commercial 
banks of Greece owned more than 70% of the total assets of the banking sec-
tor. Moreover, as Garganas and Tavlas (2001) report, in 1985 these three 
larger commercial banks accounted for 64% of the total private deposits and 
63% of the loans to the private sector. These three largest banks of the time 
were publicly controlled.  
More specifically, the banking sector of that period was subject to exten-
sive controls and regulations by the Central bank. Interest rates on all catego-
ries of bank deposits and loans were set administratively. Moreover, as Gar-
ganas and Tavlas (2001) underline, the allocation of financial resources, 
through the banking system, was determined according to a complex set of 
rules and regulations. The commercial banks general portfolio allocation re-
quirements included a specific fractions of their deposits for the financing of 
the public sector and small and medium-sized firms as well as long term 
                                                        
5 In statistical terms, money endogeneity implies that the different monetary aggre-
gates (e.g. M1, M2, M3) are either uncorrelated with monetary base or they “cause 
it”. As an extension to this, it is expected that changes on the money supply will be 
either uncorrelated with or will be “caused by” changes in nominal income. On the 
other hand, if financial innovations assisted by the deregulated environment and the 
increase of the commercial banks’ relative power, played no role on the effectiveness 
of monetary policy transmission mechanism, then the causality direction will be re-
versed and the mainstream school of money exogeneity will prevail.  
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loans to the industry. In addition, the quantity and terms of commercial bank 
lending to selected sectors or industries came under credit controls and regu-
lations aimed at subsidizing certain sectors. Credit expansion was subject to 
quantitative ceilings heavily dependent on central bank funds. Therefore, the 
public character of the bigger market share of the commercial banks operated 
as a guarantee for their close cooperation with the central bank regarding 
credit and monetary growth.  
Overall monetary policy was conducted through direct instruments of 
monetary control. For instance, by setting or limiting either prices (interest 
rates) or quantities (amounts of credit outstanding) through regulations.  
Between 1980 and 1987 we have the first small steps towards the finan-
cial liberalization. However, the Report of the Committee for the Reform and 
Modernization of the Greek financial system (1987) was the one which actu-
ally accelerated the deregulation of the Greek financial system. According to 
that Report, in November 1987 interest rates on time deposits were deregu-
lated and banks were allowed to offer new financial assets like Certificate of 
Deposits and Bank Bonds at market rates. Moreover, interest rates were de-
regulated on most categories of short-term and long-term loans, which ac-
counted for over 80 percent of bank lending to the private sector. The re-
serve/rebate system used for allocating bank credit was abolished in Decem-
ber 1988. In 1989, the rates of savings deposit were liberalized, but although 
they were subject to a minimum rate, established by the Bank of Greece, dur-
ing the early 90's even this was gradually abolished.  
According to Frangakis (1998), in the early 1990 another intervention re-
lated to the distinction between special credit institutions and commercial 
banks was thoroughly dismantled. This actually released these institutions 
from the existing -during the administrated period- restrictions upon the 
types and terms of lending they were allowed to undertake.  
  Moreover, on May 1991 restrictions on long term capital movements 
with EU countries were also removed and they were completely deregulated 
on March 1993. At the same year the Bank of Greece introduced further 
credit facilities for the commercial banks like the Lombard facility for short 
term financing and the facility of rediscounting promissory notes and bills of 
exchange. Finally, as Ericsson and Sharma (1996) mention, the "financial 
liberalization allowed the creation of products called synthetic swaps" in the 
Greek financial system6. This was considered as a further tool for the com-
                                                        
6For further information on the historical evolution of the Greek Financial system see 
Ericsson and Sharma (1996), Alogoskoufis (1995), Soumelis (1995) for recent over-
views. However, two very good descriptions with chronological details upon the 
deregulation in Greece are given by Papaioannou & Gatzonas (1997) and by Garga-
nas and Tavlas (2001). 
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mercial banks ability to apply an efficient liability management policy 
against central bank constraints.  
In general, all the above changes were directly linked with the commer-
cial banks’ capabilities to “challenge” the ability of the central bank to con-
trol both their credit expansion as well as monetary aggregates’ growth. 
4. Some empirical evidence from the "Greek and the International 
experience" 
In the empirical part of this paper, we will seek the existence of money 
endogeneity in the Greek economy (before and after deregulation) through 
the usage of causality tests. Although the international literature is full of 
empirical causality tests upon the money income and monetary aggregates’ 
relationships7, the Greek experience is rather limited in this issue. Sougiannis 
(1985) was the first to apply some causality tests (Sims test) for the case of 
Greece. In particular, he proxied money income with the Index of Industrial 
Production (IIP). Then by testing the direction of causality between the 
money stock M1 and the Index of Industrial Production (IIP), he found that 
the causal direction in the Greek economy is not quite clear. On the other 
hand, by testing the causal relationship between M2 (broader definition of 
the money stock) and IIP, he found that unidirectional causality runs from 
M2 to IIP8. The question with Sougiannis’ results is basically the “soft” 
econometrics techniques applied in his study. 
Furthermore, Spiliotis (1992, ch. 3), extended the examined time period 
up to 1988 and tested the causal relationship between different monetary ag-
gregates (e.g. M1, M3) and nominal and real GDP, using the cointegration 
approach. Spiliotis’ long run causality results initially seem to favor the 
Monetarist view that money “causes” income. On the other hand, the short 
run causality results verify this outcome only between money and nominal 
income but not the real one. Moreover, even his long run causality results do 
                                                        
7
 See, for instance, Stock & Watson (1989), Friedman & Kuttner (1993), Palley 
(1994), Hafer & Kutan (1997) for the U.S. case as well as Krol & Ohanian (1990), 
Hayo (1998), Hussein & Howells (1998) and Hafer & Kutan (1999) for some multi-
country causality approaches on the money endogeneity issue. 
8
 The above causality results are not irrelevant from the existing relationship between 
the money supply and the public deficit. This relationship is crucially related with 
the specific institutional framework under consideration and the way in which mone-
tary authorities act in relation to the fiscal authorities, and, in a more general sense, 
how the monetary authorities react to changes in the public debt. In other words, the 
degree of monetization of the public sector deficit varies from country to country, 
depending on the precise nature of the financial institutional arrangements. 
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not lack autocorrelation problems, which make the “Monetarist long run ver-
dict” dubious.  
In addition, both articles “incorporate” the same problem : The causality 
results have been produced during the administrated time period of the Greek 
banking system. In other words, they do not actually enter into the period of 
real and accelerating deregulation.  
Some more recent approaches concerning Greece on the money endoge-
neity/exogeneity question have been presented by Apergis and Tsoulfidis 
(1998) and Hayo (1998). More analytically, Hayo (1998) in his multi country 
approach included Greece in his causality tests. His estimating period is from 
the mid 60’s to mid 90’s. The causality tests were between output and narrow 
money (m1) and broad money (m3) for both levels and differences. Hayo’s 
results favor the monetarists assumption that money causes income. Never-
theless, the problem with these results is that the lag specification of the 
VAR causality tests has been produced abstractly9. On the other hand, in 
Apergis and Tsoulfidis (1998) empirical approach, only short run causality 
results between M1 and real GDP, were presented. Their estimating period 
was 75:1 to 93:4. and the final outcome supported the feedback assumption 
between money and income. 
Regarding the international literature, the most recent characteristic ex-
amples of endogeneity testing -with the usage of the Granger causality meth-
odology- is linked with the relationship between credit and different mone-
tary aggregates. In this kind of bivariate tests, endogeneity is accepted when 
credit «Granger-causes» monetary aggregates10. In other words, monetary 
authorities cannot effectively constraint any demand determined credit ex-
pansion. The causality approaches of Howells and Houssein (1998), Nell 
(2000) and Vera (2001) are the most characteristic cases. In Howells and 
Houssein’s study, the causal relationship between bank lending (BL) and M3 
was implemented for the G7 countries. The outcome was that bank lending 
(BL) causes M3 in France, Italy, Japan, UK and US, which is a cornerstone 
for accepting money endogeneity in these countries. Nell, on the other hand, 
tested money endogeneity for South Africa (S.A.) by running causality tests 
between loans (by credit worthy borrowers) and deposits. The outcome 
showed that loans cause deposits in S.A. and therefore endogeneity was in a 
sense verified. Finally, Vera’s money endogeneity question for Spain was 
tested by determining the causality direction between bank lending (BL), 
monetary base (MB) and money Supply (MS). The outcome was that BL 
                                                        
9
 Not to mention the non reliable GNP Greek data which are frequently revised. 
10
 In a broader explanation of the causality tests, even a non-causality result can be 
interpreted as non-orthodox outcome. 
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causes MB which causes MS. This result was in favor of the money endoge-
neity assumption11.  
Before the presentation of the empirical part of our study we will present 
the data and the variables which we will use in our causality approach.  
5. The data  
Our causality analysis covers the relationships between money supply 
and the index of industrial production as well as the relationships between 
the monetary base and different monetary aggregates, using monthly data 
from 1975(1) to 1998(2). In particular, the variables to be used are : the index 
of industrial production (I.I.P.), the high powered money (monetary base, 
MB), the narrow money (M1) and two broad money variables (M3, M4). The 
index of industrial production has been selected here as a proxy for GDP. 
This does not imply that there are no drawbacks for this selection12.  
6. Econometric methodology and empirical results 
Our empirical procedure was based on Lutkepohl and Reimers (1992) 
methodological approach of causality. More specifically, this kind of causal-
ity follows the principles of co-integration in bivariate VAR systems, on a 
step by step basis. This methodology was also used in other empirical papers 
(see Alexakis, Panagopoulos, Spiliotis (2000)). The reason for this specific 
VAR methodological approach is simple : It does not require ex ante imple-
mentation of the unit root tests on the incorporated variables. In other words, 
it allows the implication of the Granger-causality approach without the pre 
determination of the degree of the variables integration (e.g. whether they are 
I(1) or I(2)).  
The crucial point here is that if the number of cointegrating vectors be-
tween the two variables are 1 or 0 (r=1,0) then the EC.VAR’s are imple-
mented at the first differences. If, on the other hand, the number of cointe-
grating vectors are two (r=2) the EC.VAR’s are implemented at the levels of 
                                                        
11
 All the previously mentioned international studies are linked not only with the 
assumption of money endogeneity testing but also with the idea of searching whether 
any possible money endogeneity follows the Horizontialist or the Structuralist or the 
liquidity preference School of post-Keynesian thought (see for example Nell 2000 
and Vera 2001). In our study however we will be restricted on testing whether money 
supply in Greece is endogenously or exogenously determined. The kind of such pos-
sible endogeneity is beyond of our scope here.  
12
 The basic drawback is that the importance of industrial production is persistently 
decreasing in the Greek GDP. On the other hand, GDP data are not available –for the 
examined time period- neither in quarterly nor in monthly basis. 
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the two variables. Finally, for all the bivariate VAR causality tests applied 
here (as well as Johansen results and Wald’s short run causality tests), the LR 
test for the lag length selection has been implemented13. 
The empirical results 
Our first priority here is to test whether a structural break exist in our 
causality tests due to the deregulation of the financial system. Table A pre-
sents the Chow tests for structural break in our data. Such evidence in our 
data seems to exist after 1994 between the index of industrial production and 
the different monetary aggregates (except M1) but not between the monetary 
base and the different monetary aggregates. From these results we cannot 
actually accept a structural break in our system due to the deregulation of the 
financial system. Therefore, any attempt to break the sample in two periods –
before and after deregulation– is not actually supported by the data.  
In Table 1a, we report the likelihood ratio [Johansen] results concerning all 
the examined bivariate sets of variables between monetary aggregates and the 
index of industrial production (with and without deterministic trend in the data). 
 
Table 1a: The Johansen Results (Monetary Aggregates vs. 
Industrial Production) Monthly data (1975Q1 - 1998Q2) 
 Hypothesis  Likelihood 5% Numb. Of No. of 
 H0 H1 Eigenvalues Ratio Critical Value C.E(s) lags 
(Assuming deterministic trend in the data) 
LMB & LIIP variables 
 r = 0 r = 1 0.07 28.1 15.41 
 r ≤ 1 r = 2 0.02 7.5 3.76 r = 2 14 
 
LM1 & LIIP variables 
 r = 0 r = 1 0.06 21.23 15.41 
 r ≤ 1 r = 2 0.01 3.08 3.76 r = 1 14 
  
LM3 & LIIP variables  
(1980Q1 - 1998Q2) 
 r = 0 r = 1 0.10 28.49 15.41 
 r ≤ 1 r = 2 0.02 5.38 3.76 r = 2 14 
 
LM4 & LIIP variables  
(1980Q1 - 1998Q2) 
 r = 0 r = 1 0.03 12.76 15.41 
 r ≤ 1 r = 2 0.02 5.29 3.76 r = 0 16 
                                                        
13
 All LR tests results for lag length selection of the causality tests have been pro-
duced with the help of Microfit 3.0 and are available upon request. 
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(Assuming no deterministic trend in the data) 
LMB & LIIP variables 
 r = 0 r = 1 0.09 47,16 19.96 
 r ≤ 1 r = 2 0.07 20,53 9.24 r = 2 14 
 
LM1 & LIIP variables 
 r = 0 r = 1 0.10 48,97 19.96 
 r ≤ 1 r = 2 0.06 18,10 9.24 r = 1 14 
 
LM3 & LIIP variables  
(1980Q1 - 1998Q2) 
 r = 0 r = 1 0.11 30,15 19.96 
 r ≤ 1 r = 2 0.02 5.43 9.24 r = 2 14 
 
LM4 & LIIP variables  
 (1980Q1 - 1998Q2) 
 r = 0 r = 1 0.03 13,21 19.96 
 r ≤ 1 r = 2 0.02 5.35 9.24 r = 0 16 
 
From the produced results it appears that there is no long run relationship 
between the different monetary aggregates and the index of industrial pro-
duction (I.I.P.) with the exception of the narrow money (M1) variable. In 
Table 1b, we report the likelihood ratio [Johansen] results between the mone-
tary base and the alternative monetary aggregates (with and without determi-
nistic trend in the data). 
 
Table 1b: The Johansen Results (Monetary Base vs. Monetary 
Aggregates)) Monthly data (1975Q1 - 1998Q2) 
 Hypothesis  Likelihood 5% Numb. Of No. of 
 H0 H1 Eigenvalues Ratio Critical Value C.E(s) lags 
(Assuming deterministic trend in the data) 
LMB & LMI variables 
 r = 0 r = 1 0.02 8.92 15.41 
 r ≤ 1 r = 2 0.003 0.88 3.76 r = 0 12 
 
LMB & LM3 variables 
(1980Q1 - 1998Q2) 
 r = 0 r = 1 0.17 45.10 15.41 
 r ≤ 1 r = 2 0.02 5.09 3.76 r = 2 11 
  
LMB & LM4 variables  
(1980Q1 - 1998Q2) 
 r = 0 r = 1 0.05 13,92 15.41 
 r ≤ 1 r = 2 0.007 1.54 3.76 r = 0 11 
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(Assuming no deterministic trend in the data) 
LMB & LM1 variables 
 r = 0 r = 1 0.11 41,44 19.96 
 r ≤ 1 r = 2 0.02 7,85 9.24 r = 1 12 
 
LMB & LM3 variables 
(1980Q1 - 1998Q2) 
 r = 0 r = 1 0.23 64,15 19.96 
 r ≤ 1 r = 2 0.04 9,40 9.24 r = 2 11 
 
LMB & LM4 variables  
(1980Q1 - 1998Q2) 
 r = 0 r = 1 0.08 23,23 19.96 
 r ≤ 1 r = 2 0.01 3.93 9.24 r = 1 11 
* At 1% we accept that r =1 between the two variables  
 
Provided that no deterministic trend in the data is assumed, Monetary 
Base (MB) is cointegrated, at a 5% critical value, with all the other monetary 
aggregates, with the exception of the narrow definition of the money stock 
(M1) variable. However, the LR ratio for MB and M1 is very close to the 
critical value and at a 1% level we can consider that they are co-integrated. 
In other words, Monetary Base (MB) can be considered been cointegrated 
with all the other monetary aggregates.  
Our next step will be a brief presentation and implementation of the 
Wald tests for defining the direction of short - run causality between the pre-
viously examined sets of variables. 
The Wald - test for short - run causality definition 
As we have already mentioned, the number of the existing co-integrating 
vectors (e.g. r = 0, 1, 2), will accordingly transform the nature of our Granger 
- causality bivariate error-correction tests. Wald tests will then be applied (in 
order to define the direction of causality in all pairs of variables).  
According to Toda and Phillips (1991, Collorary 1.1 and Theorem 2) the 
Wald Likelihood ratio test (λw) has an asymptotic X2(p) distribution14 if the 
co - integration rank of matrix Π is equal to one or two (e.g. r = 1 or 2). Fur-
thermore, as Lutkepohl and Reimers (1992) say, “if r = 0 , the VAR coeffi-
cients may be estimated in first differences and the resulting Wald statistic 
for testing Granger - causality has an asymptotic X2 (p-1) distribution”. 
                                                        
14P is the number of restrictions which are tested when a Wald test is applied. It is 
also the lag length of the corresponding bivariate VAR system [e.g. VAR (p) ] we 
mentioned and specified with the help of LR test.  
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As we mentioned in section 6, when r = 0 our Granger - causality bivari-
ate tests will have no error-correction term (as Π = 0). Moreover, if r = 2 then 
Π is nonsingular and then the bivariate system is stationary in levels (without 
taking differences)15. 
The empirical results 
Table 2(a) presents the results from the implementation of the Wald test 
between monetary aggregates and the index of industrial production (I.I.P.). 
 
Table 2a : Wald - tests for short run Granger - Causality  
Monthly data (1975Q1 - 1998Q2) 
(Monetary Aggregates vs. Industrial Production) 
 
  Hypothesis Co-integration rank
 
(r = 2) no. of 
 H0 X2 – test F- test lags 
 LMB does not cause LIIP 55,2 3,94 14 
 LIIP does not cause LMB 132,2 9,44 
 
 (1980Q1 - 1998Q2) 
 LM3 does not cause LIIP 69,9 4,99 14  
 LIIP does not cause LM3 28,75 2,05 
 Hypothesis  Co-integration rank (r = 1) 
 H0  X2 - test  F- test 
 ∆LM1 does not cause ∆LIIP 43,4 3,10 14 
 ∆LIIP does not cause ∆LM1 85,3 6,09 
 Hypothesis Co-integration rank (r = 0) 
  H0 X2 – test  F- test 
 ∆LM4 does not cause ∆LIIP  50,73 3,17 16 
 ∆LIIP does not cause ∆LM4 34,28 2,14 
Note : The critical values for the tests are : 
X2 (14) = 26,12 when r = 0 and X2 (15) = 23,34 when r = 1,2 for 0.025 level of significance. 
F (14,278) = 1,74 when r = 0 and F (12,278) = 1,80 when r= 1,2 for 5% level of significance. 
 
From the above results we can easily infer that feedback results are pro-
duced for all the examined cases.  
 
 
                                                        
15
 On the other hand, when r = 1 the corresponding Granger - causality bivariate er-
ror-correction tests will have an error-correction term (as Π ≠ 0 and singular). In 
other words, our causality bivariate error-correction tests will follow the classical 
Granger and Engle (1987) two - step procedure. 
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Table 2b now presents the short run causality results between Monetary 
Base (MB) and the alternative monetary aggregates.  
 
Table 2b : Wald - tests for short run Granger - Causality 
Monthly data (1975Q1 - 1998Q2) 
(Monetary Base vs. Monetary Aggregates) 
 
 Hypothesis Co-integration rank
 
(r = 1*,0**) no. of 
 H0 X2 – test F- test lags 
 ∆LMB does not cause ∆LM1 49,3 4,11 12 
 ∆LM1 does not cause ∆LMB 33,2 2,77 
 
 (1980Q1 - 1998Q2) 
 ∆LMB does not cause ∆LM4 98,4 8,94 11 
 ∆LM4 does not cause ∆LMB 91,8 8,35  
 Hypothesis  Co-integration rank (r = 2) 
 H0 X2 - test F- test 
 (1980Q1 - 1998Q2) 
 LMB does not cause LM3 83,3 3,94 11 
 LM3 does not cause LMB 149,0 13,5  
Note : The critical values for the tests are : 
X2 (11) = 21,92 when r = 0 and X2 (12) = 23,34 when r = 1,2 for 0.025 level of significance. 
F (11,278) = 1,83 when r = 0 and F (12,278) = 1,80 when r= 1,2 for 5% level of significance. 
*Assuming no deterministic trend in the data, **Assuming deterministic 
trend in the data 
 
As in the case of Table 1a we can infer that feedback results are also pro-
duced in all the examined cases.  
The EC.VAR/Causality test for the long - run causality definition 
Following Jenkinson’s (1986) methodology, the direction of the long-run 
causality among two variables will be basically revealed from their long run 
relationship incorporated as an explanatory variable – defined as ECT term 
in Table 3- inside a two step ECM/Causality test approach16. In other words, 
the statistical significance of this term/variable will show us the direction of 
the long-run causality. These tests are the most crucial of all because they 
can guide us to theoretical answers regarding the exogenous or endogenous 
nature of money.  
                                                        
16
 The ECM/Causality methodology applied here is under the constraint that it is 
only a test and not a model.  
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The empirical results 
Table 3 presents the results from the implementation of the ECVAR 
tests. 
Table 3 : The EC.VAR tests (1975-1998) 
 n n 
∆yt = const. + Σα∆y t-1 + Σβ∆x t-1 - γ ECT-1 + e t 
 i=1 j=1
 
Variables γ - coefficient 
& (t- ratio) 
Long - run causality 
direction 
No of 
lags 
(assuming deterministic trend in the data) 
∆LM1 vs ∆LIIP 
 
-0,0004 
(-0,53) 
14 
∆LIIP vs ∆LM1 
 
-0,003 
(-4,02) 
 
LM1 causes LIIP 
 
(assuming no deterministic trend in the data) 
∆LM1 vs ∆LIIP 
 
-0,006 
(-5,40) 
14 
∆LIIP vs ∆LM1 
 
0,0004 
(0,39) 
 
LIIP causes LM1 
 
∆LMB vs ∆LM1 
 
0,03 
(3,96) 
12 
∆LM1 vs ∆LMΒ 
 
-0,04 
(-5,60) 
 
LMB causes LM1 
 
∆LMB vs ∆LM3 
 
0,03 
(-2,05) 
11 
∆LM3 vs ∆LMΒ 
 
-0,04 
(5,85) 
 
LM3 causes LMB 
 
∆LMB vs ∆LM4 
 
-0,08 
(-3,15) 
11 
∆LM4 vs ∆LMB 
 
0,04 
(4,02) 
 
LM4 causes LMB 
 
 
From the above results we can infer the following : Assuming the exis-
tence of a deterministic trend in the data, narrow money (M1) seems to 
“Granger-cause” the index of industrial production (I.I.P). On the other hand, 
if we assume no deterministic trend in the data, we have many more long run 
causality results available we can comment upon. More analytically, the in-
dex of industrial production « Granger-causes» M1 and monetary aggregates 
M3 and M4 « Granger-cause» Monetary base (MB). On the other hand, 
Monetary base (MB) seems to «cause» M1. This last point however can be 
Testing Money Supply Endogeneity: The case of Greece (1975-1998) 
 
99
justified if we consider that, as Zis and Papadopoulos (1997) noted, the de-
mand for M1 in Greece is unstable.  
7. Concluding comments 
The basic aim of this paper was the clarification of the way the nature of 
money has evolved during the last 23 years in the Greek Monetary System. 
Based on the Lutkepohl and Reimers (1992) causality methodology that was 
implemented, we can now infer that the empirical evidence showed the fol-
lowing results : 
First of all, the statistical evidence does not support the assumption of a 
structural break in a particular year regarding the monetary aggregates as a 
consequence of the gradual deregulation process of the late 80’s.  
Moreover, all data used are very sensitive to the existence of a determi-
nistic trend. More analytically, if we assume such existence the only long run 
causality result is that the index of industrial production «Granger-causes» 
M1. Although this is a post Keynesian outcome it is not sufficient to reach a 
verdict concerning the nature of money in Greece. Moreover, in the short run 
we have clear feedback results which also leave little room for any clear de-
cision regarding the nature of money in Greece.  
If we now assume that there is no deterministic trend in the data we can 
reach the verdict that money in Greece is endogenously determined. This is 
advocated from the direction of the long run causalities between the mone-
tary base (MB) and the two broader definition of the monetary aggregates, 
M3 and M4. More specifically M3 and M4 “Granger–cause” MB which is an 
indication that money is endogenously determined and therefore the Greek 
monetary authorities cannot quite effectively exercise some control over the 
real economy through the money supply process (using the monetary base 
variable as a policy ‘tool’). In this case we can accept the Post Keynesian 
view regarding central bank’s behaviour as a lender of last resort.  
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Table A: Chow test for structural break (1975Q1 - 1998Q2) 
Variables X2 (1)  
 
Monetary aggregates vs. Industrial production 
LM4 vs LIIP 5,07 (1996:5) 2,4 (1996:6) 
LM3 vs LIIP 6,55 (1994:1) 3,7 (1994:2) 
LM1 vs LIIP - - - - 
LMB vs LIIP 7,49 (1994:1) 4,04 (1994:2) 
 
Monetary base vs. Monetary aggregates 
LMB vs LM1 - - - - 
LMB vs LM3 - - - - 
LMB vs LM4 - - - - 
